LANDLORD AND TENANT: LANDLORD HAS
DUTY TO PROTECT TENANT
FROM
FORESEEABLE
CRIMINAL
ACTS
OF
INTRUDERS IN COMMON AREAS
In Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.,' the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a
landlord has a duty to use reasonable care to safeguard his tenants
from foreseeable criminal acts committed by third parties and to
protect those parts of his premises which are not usually subject to
periodic police patrol. In 1959, when the tenant first leased her
apartment from the landlord, the main and garage entrances to the
585 unit complex were monitored at all times by building attendants;
a third entrance was unguarded during the daylight hours but was
locked after 9:00 P.M. By 1966, however, the main and garage
entrances were frequently left unattended, and the third entrance often
remained unlocked overnight. The tenant was injured seriously when
she was criminally assaulted in the hallway of the apartment complex
by an intruder. She sued the landlord, alleging that a series of
assaults, robberies, and other criminal offenses had occurred against
tenants in the common areas of the apartment building since the
slackening. of the security measures.2 The district court ruled as a
matter of law that the landlord had no duty to protect his tenants
from the foreseeable criminal acts of third parties.3 The court of
appeals reversed and remanded for a determination of damages.
While in most instances one is not under a legal obligation to
protect another from the activities of a third person,' relationships do
exist between parties of "such a character that the law imposes the
affirmative duty upon one person to attempt to control another's
conduct to avoid an unreasonable risk to a third person. ' "
Traditionally, this responsibility has been imposed, inter alia, upon
1. No. 23,401 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 1970).

2. The dissenting judge asserted that the record showed but one prior asault and no robberies.
Id.at 23.
3. Id.at i.
4. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 54 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER];
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965); Harper & Kime, The Duly to Control the
Conduct ofAnother,43 YALE LJ.886 (1934).
5. Harper & Kime, supra note 4, at 887. See also PROSSER § 53, at 331; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A, comment b (1965).
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carriers,' innkeepers, 7 schoolmasters, 8 storekeepers, 9 and operators of
recreational facilities. 10 The duty arises because the individual has
entrusted his comfort and safety to the care of the person who has a
greater capacity to prevent disturbance or mishap due to his control
2
over the premises or vehicle." For example, in Gurren v. Casperson,
a female guest requested that the hotel management protect her from
the threats of another guest. When the management did not maintain
surveillance over the belligerent guest who subsequently assaulted the
plaintiff outside her door, the hotel owner was held liable for her
injuries. In Fortney v. Hotel Rancroft, Inc.,13 a guest locked his door,

leaving his key with the clerk as he departed for the evening. When he
reentered his locked room later that night, he was knocked

unconscious by an intruder. Since no explanation was offered by the
hotel as to how an intruder could pass the desk unnoticed, the court

found the hotel owner negligent, emphasizing that the relationship of
innkeeper and guest imposed a duty upon the defendant to use a "high
degree of care"' 4 to secure the safety of its guests. Yet from the

earliest days the courts have held that the landlord is not a guarantor
of the safety of his premises or his tenants.' 5 This immunity of the

landlord from the legal duties of the innkeeper and the carrier is
largely explained by the agrarian past of the law of landlord and

tenant, where, absent express covenants, the basic agreement between
the parties was for the exchange of possession for rent." Since the
6. E.g., Neering v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 383 I11. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943); Amoruso v. New
York City Transit Authority, 12 App. Div. 2d 11, 207 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1960).
7. E.g., Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 254 Minn. 373,95 N.W.2d 657 (1959); Schubartv. Hotel
Astor, Inc., 168 Misc. 431,5 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 255 App. Div. 1012,8 N.Y.S.2d
567 (1938), affdper curiam, 381 N.Y. 597, 22 N.E.2d 167 (1939).
8. E.g., McLeod v. Grant County School Dist., 42 Wash. 2d 316,255 P.2d 360 (1953).
9. E.g., Viands v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 107 A.2d 118 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1954); Cjka v.
R.H. Macy's Co., 155 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1956), rev'd on othergrounds, 3 App. Div. 2d
535, 162 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1957), affd, 4 N.Y.2d 785, 173 N.Y.S.2d 24, 149 N.E.2d 525 (1958).
10. E.g., Quinn v. Smith Co., 57 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1932) (swimming pool); Pfeifer v.
Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., 259 Wis. 333, 48 N.W.2d 505 (1957) (theater). See also St.
Julian v. State, 82 So. 2d 85 (La. App. 1955) (jailor-prisoner); Sylvester v. Northwestern
Hospital, 236 Minn. 384,53 N.W.2d 17 (1952) (hospital-patient).
II. See notes 6, 7 & 8 supra.
12. 147 Wash. 257, 265 P.472 (1928).
13. 5 II1. App. 2d 327, 125 N.E.2d 544 (1955).
14. Id.at548.
15. See generally PROSSER § 63.
16. See Quinn &Phillips, The Law ofLandlordand Tenant. A CriticalEvaluationof the Past
with Guidelinesfor the Future, 38 FORD L. REv.225,227-28 (1969).
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landowner was generally not resident on the same parcel, he had no
greater control over the premises than his tenant. Although these
medieval conditions no longer influence metropolitan lives, they are
only now losing their influence over the legal relationship between the
17
urban landlord and his tenant.
Courts generally have proceeded on a tort theory in expanding the
duties of the landlord to require him to use reasonable care to assure
the safety of the premises retained under his control. Fundamental to
the application of this theory is 'his "retained control" and the
corresponding lack of control of the tenants. Thus, the Court of
8
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Kay v. Cain"
affirmed an award to a tenant who fell in an unlighted hallway,
stressing the duty of the landlord to use reasonable diligence for the
maintenance of areas under his control. This theory was followed in
Pessagno v. Euclid Investment Co.19 and Robinson v. Park Central

Apartments,2° both involving falls on icy sidewalks, in which the
courts reemphasized the "exclusive control" aspect of Kay v. Cain as
the basis for imposing the duty on the landlord. On this same theory,
a duty to control third parties has been found to rest upon the
landlord. In three cases 21 involving tenants' children injured by other
minors at play on the premises, the courts recognized an affirmative
duty on the part of the landlord adequately to supervise persons
engaging in potentially hazardous activities on the common areas of
the premises under his control.
The majority of courts have held that the landlord is not liable for
the criminal acts of intruders,2 although several have found liability,
relying upon the similarities between the modern apartment owner
and the innkeeper and upon the duty of the landlord to keep the areas
17. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Whetzel v.
Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 Fld 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d
509 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969); Bass v. City of New York, 61 Misc.2d 465, 305 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup.
Ct. 1969).
18. 154 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
19. 112 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
20. 248 F. Supp. 632 (D.D.C. 1965).
21. Mayer v. Housing Authority, 84 N.J. Super. 411, 202 A.2d 439 (App. Div. 1964); Geigel
v. New York Housing Authority, 225 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup. Ct. 1962); DaRocha v. New York
Housing Authority, 109 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1951), affd, 282 App. Div. 728, 122 N.Y.S.2d

397 (1953).
22. E.g., Applebaum v. Kidwell, 12 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Goldberg v. Housing
Authority, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962). Landlords have been held liable for the criminal
acts of their employees against tenants. Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc., 236 F.2d 673 (D.C.
Cir. 1956).
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under his exclusive control safe. In Ramsay v. Morrissette,z3 the
landlord originally employed a resident manager to watch over the
common areas but, upon the manager's death, failed to hire a
permanent replacement. Although warned that conditions on the
premises were degenerating and that vagrants were sleeping in the
hallways, the landlord neglected to improve the situation. After a
tenant was assaulted by an intruder, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals indicated that there was a duty to provide some protection
against attacks by intruders.Y In reaching its conclusion, that court
relied on Kay v. Cainzs and, on the authority of Kendall v. Gore
Properties,Inc.,6 extended the duty of the landlord to require him to

restrain third persons. In Kendall, the landlord hired a painter,
knowing only that he worked "at the Air Force," and allowed him to
work unsupervised in the apartment of a female tenant whom he
strangled to death only one day later. Holding the landlord liable, the
court noted that he was under a duty "to take such steps as an
ordinarily prudent person. . would have exercised to avoid injury to
his tenant. . . ."27 In Bass v. City of New York2 the court held that

a landlord who once undertakes police surveillance must then
maintain it with diligence lest his tenants rely to their detriment on the
earlier level of protection. A case which on facts analogous to Ramsay
and Bass does not impose liability on the landlord is Goldberg v.
Housing Authority,2 where plaintiff, a milkman, was robbed and
beaten in midafternoon in one of defendant's self-service elevators.
Even though the landlord had knowledge of numerous prior acts of a
similar nature, there was only one special policeman assigned to
patrol the entire 6,000 tenant complex during the time the attack
occurred. The Goldberg court limited its decision to a holding that the
landlord is under no duty to hire special police, thus avoiding the more
difficult question of whether he need provide any protection at all.
Drawing from this line of precedent, the court of appeals in Kline
v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.30 restated the rule

that a landlord must use ordinary care and diligence to assure the
23.
24.
25.
26.

252 A.2d 509 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969), noted in 48 N.C.L. REv. 713 (1970).
Id. at512.
154 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956).

27. Id. at 680.
28. 305 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
29. 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962). See also 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 784 (1963).
30. No. 23,401 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 1970).
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reasonably safe condition of the areas reserved for the common use of
his tenants3 1 and, citing Kendall v. Gore Properties,Inc.,3 brought the
predictable criminal acts of intruders within the circle of dangers from
which the reasonably prudent landlord will protect his tenants. While
acknowledging the general proposition that a private person has no
duty to protect another from criminal attacks, the majority refused to
apply it to the facts of the case, recognizing instead the similarities
between the innkeepers in Gurrenn and Fortneyu and the multi-unit
apartment landlord in Kline. Since both the apartment tenant and the
hotel guest have entrusted themselves to the care of others in better
positions to insure that proper precautions are taken, the court placed
a similar duty of protection upon the landlord as on the innkeeper;
"there is implied in the contract between landlord and tenant an
obligation on the landlord to provide those protective measures which
are within his reasonable capacity.' ' n With the existence of a duty
established, the court determined that the appellee failed to meet the
standard of care which was defined as "reasonable care in all the
circumstances." To the anticipated charge that crime deterrence is a
police function, the majority pointed out the sheer inability of public
authorities to patrol all the corridors of a large city and noted the
frequent overlap of civilian and police responsibilities. That the cost
of these preventive measures will be passed on to the tenants was
recognized and viewed as a beneficial exchange for the elimination of
human suffering and increased insurance premiums which crime
engenders. 37 The dissenting opinion, while sympathizing with the
"hysteria of apartment dwellers in an inner city plagued with
crime, ' "' I would require, an express contractual basis for any police
protection desired by tenants, since an injustice to the landlord results
if a tenant may recover for an injury arising out of a danger of which
he was fully aware.39 The dissenting judge contended that the plaintiff
had not proved that the landlord was on notice of a dangerous
31. See, e.g., Kay v. Cain, 154 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
32. 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956).

33. Gurren v. Casperson, 147 Wash. 257, 265 P. 472 (1928). See text accompanying note 12
supra.
34. Fortney v. Hotel Rancroft, Inc., 5 II1. App. 327, 125 N.E.2d 544 (1955). See text
accompanying note 13 supra.
35. No.23,401 at 14.
36. Id. at 15; see Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959)
37. No.23,401 at21.
38. Id. at 29 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
39. Id.
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situation, since, according to the record, there had been only one act
of violence on the premises prior to the Kline assault. He argued that
since the plaintiff's tenancy was on a month to month basis, the
relevant standard to determine the level of protection implied in
contract was that of the current month. 0 Finally, the dissent attacked
the court's reliance on Gurren and Fortney, noting especially that, in
the former case, the court found liability only where a guest expressly
requested protection from the threats of a specific guest.
In Kline, the court of appeals focused upon the coalescence of tort
and contract principles; hence, the precise foundation for the duty it
imposes is difficult to characterize. The court is most persuasive in its
tort analysis, although its reliance on the innkeeper analogy is
questionable since no case is cited where the hotel owner was obliged
to safeguard his corridors from the criminal acts of unknown
intruders. The majority is more convincing, however, when it
concentrates on the fundamental principles of tort law. The concept of
control is central to the imposition of the duty of care, for it is only
reasonable that he who has control of the premises must make them
safe for those lawfully upon them. To assert that "safe" implies "safe
from the predictable criminal acts of intruders" is innovative but not
illogical. 41 In spite of the apparent adequacy of the tort theory, the
court utilizes contract principles to further sustain the imposition of
the duty' of care. If an implied contract imposes upon the landlord a
duty to provide those security measures "within his reasonable
capacity, ' 4 2 it is difficult to distinguish this duty from the duty found
on the basis of the tort theory. If, however, the duty of the landlord
imposed by implied contract is only to "keep the premises in their
beginning condition during the lease term," 43 as the court later
intimates, the holding is limited by the facts of the case, and no duty
in contract would rest upon a landlord who fails from the outset to
institute protective measures. The court's desire to announce a
contractual basis for the duty, when an adequate tort basis is
available, may stem from an inclination voiced in Javins v. First
National Realty Corp.44 and reaffirmed in Kline to treat urban
40. Id.

41. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 302B, 314A(3), 314A(4), Comments e, f;
Caveat to § 314A; § 315(b) (1965).
42. No.23,401 at 14.
43. Id. at 15.
44. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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apartment leases not as property conveyances but as contracts. By
this analysis the law of urban landlord and tenant is removed from the
relatively rigid concept of property law and allowed to adopt the more
flexible principles governing contracts for the sale of goods and
services.4 In addition, on the facts of the instant case, an action on the
contract might have been brought-prior to any personal injury to the
tenant.
Focusing on the breadth of the holding in Kline, that an urban
landlord must take reasonable steps to protect his tenants from the
foreseeable criminal acts of third parties, it is immediately obvious
that the required level of protection will necessarily be highest in the
poor, crime-ridden areas of our central cities. There, the predictability
of criminal activity may be so great that only costly and elaborate
security devices and private police patrols will satisfy the
"reasonableness" requirement of the majority's holding. For those
apartment complexes leasing to persons of average means, such a duty
may be reasonable, for the tenants are capable of absorbing the higher
costs of 24 hour guards and expensive security equipment. Similarly,
tenants of public housing projects would benefit from the imposition
of such a duty so long as any increased cost is born by the tenant qua
taxpayer rather than by the tenant qua tenant. But those unable to
obtain public housing and already disadvantaged by relegation to the
' are further burdened by the added
"inner city plagued with crime" 46
47
costs of protective measures. Yet one can agree with the court that in
the context of the multi-unit dwelling the costs of reasonable security
precautions to any single tenant may be far outweighed by the benefits
he will reap from them-.Even so, there is an intuitive reaction against
compelling those in the inner city to finance their own protection when
those in other areas may safely rely upon the tax-supported civil
authorities." Until united community action programs function to
prevent crime, we must settle for such measures as those enunciated in
Kline which at least aid the urban dweller in his attempt to pursue a
life free of the terror of unrestrained crime.
45. As an alternative theory, the majority intimates that the concept of the implied warranty
of habitability recently reemphasized in Javins may apply to the facts of Kline, and indicates
that reasonable security precautions may be within that package of conditions which constitutes
habitability.
46. No.23,401 at29.
47. See Goldberg v. Housing Authority, 38 N.J. 578,591, 186 A.2d 291,298 (1962).
48. Should rent controls or similar legislative devices be in effect, the burden will not even be
shifted to the tenant but will remain upon the landlord.

